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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Wayne D. Anderson, II, asserts the district court abused its discretion in his post-
conviction proceeding when it denied his motions to proceed as a pro se litigant, 
dismiss court-appointed counsel, and extend time to prepare an amended petition, 
because the district court did not recognize his right to self-representation. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 In an underlying criminal case, Canyon County No. CR 2011-31445, 
Mr. Anderson was charged with one count of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, 
one count of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen, and sentencing 
enhancements on both counts.  (R., pp.4, 80.)  He entered an Alford plea1 to the lewd 
conduct count and a previous sex offense conviction sentencing enhancement.  
(R., p.80.)   
 Mr. Anderson later moved to withdraw the plea primarily on the basis of undue 
coercion from his wife, and the district court denied the motion.  (R., p.80.)  
Mr. Anderson then filed a motion to reconsider on the basis he was suffering from 
undue mental duress and severe depression when he entered the plea, and his plea 
was therefore not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary.  (R., pp.80-81.)  The district court 
denied the motion to reconsider.  (R., p.81.)  The district court sentenced Mr. Anderson 
to a unified sentence of forty years, with fifteen years fixed.  (R., pp.4, 81.)  
                                            
1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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Mr. Anderson appealed, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the 
district court.  State v. Anderson, 156 Idaho 230 (Ct. App. 2014). 
 Mr. Anderson filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief, based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  (R., pp.4-8.)  Mr. Anderson asserted trial counsel “failed to 
present available evidence from Canyon Co. Jail and Medical Center, of my suicidal 
state . . . failed to present available testimony evidence from myself of my suicide 
attempts, including on the day of plea,” and “failed to [counsel] me of need for 
competency or mental health evaluation to [supply] to the court during withdrawal 
[proceeding].”  (See R., pp.5-6.) 
 In the attached Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post-Conviction Petition, 
Mr. Anderson asserted that because of those failings, the State was able to prevail in its 
argument that he was merely severely depressed, when he was in fact severely suicidal 
and therefore rendered intellectually and constitutionally incapable of offering a 
competent Alford plea.  (See R., p.9.)  Mr. Anderson had been placed on suicide watch 
upon being booked into the Canyon County Jail, but the experience only compounded 
his misery.  (R., p.10.)  He stated he learned there to not disclose or hint at his suicidal 
ideation.  (R., p.10.)  After being released from suicide watch, he planned to hang 
himself from the ceiling of his cell, but never made an earnest attempt.  (R., p.10.)  
When he was later placed in protective custody, he planned to hang himself in the 
shower stalls and made several earnest attempts with that plan.  (R., pp.10-11.)   
 Mr. Anderson also wrote that on the day he entered his Alford plea, he planned 
to end his life after taking the weapon from the armed bailiff who was escorting him 
back to jail from the hearing   (See R., pp.11-13.)  Mr. Anderson stated he did not go 
 3 
through with that plan because there was a good chance he would have to hurt or kill 
the bailiff.  (R., p.13.) 
 Additionally, Mr. Anderson averred that it never occurred to his trial counsel to 
request a competency or mental health evaluation, or that Mr. Anderson make any 
mental or emotional issue known to the district court during the change of plea hearing.  
(R., pp.13-14.)  He further stated trial counsel failed to present evidence of 
Mr. Anderson’s suicidal ideation.  (R., p.14.) 
 Mr. Anderson also filed a Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of 
Counsel.  (R., pp.16-19.)  The district court entered an Order Appointing Counsel.  
(R., pp.27-28.)  The State then filed an Answer arguing that Mr. Anderson’s claims for 
post-conviction relief should be denied and/or dismissed.  (R., pp.29-32.)   
 The district court subsequently issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss Petition.  
(R., pp.80-91.)  The district court stated Mr. Anderson “has presented no evidence that 
his attorney should have been aware that Petitioner’s mental health was compromised 
to the degree that would have rendered his plea invalid at the time he changed his plea, 
other than his bare allegations which are rebutted by the Record.”  (R., p.84.)  The 
district court determined Mr. Anderson “has failed to establish by admissible evidence, 
deficient performance with respect to the failure to present evidence or request an 
evaluation at the change of plea hearing.”  (R., p.89.)  The district court also stated it 
would not consider Mr. Anderson’s claim to the extent it was alleging his plea was not 
knowingly, intelligent, and voluntary separate from the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, because that claim had been decided on direct appeal.  (R., p.89.) 
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 Regarding the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present 
testimony and evidence, the district court determined Mr. Anderson “has failed to 
provide the Court with that evidence.  Further, he has failed to show prejudice; that is, 
that the court would have granted either his motion to withdraw or his motion to 
reconsider if it had been presented with that evidence.”  (R., p.89.)  Thus, the district 
court gave Mr. Anderson notice of its intent to dismiss the post-conviction petition, and 
gave him twenty days to respond.  (See R., pp.90, 95.) 
 Mr. Anderson’s appointed post-conviction counsel then filed a Motion for More 
Time to Respond to Notice of Intent to Dismiss, based on counsel’s affidavit averring he 
needed more time to find and interview potential witnesses Mr. Anderson had identified 
to corroborate his state of mind at the time of the plea in the underlying criminal case.  
(R., pp.91-94.)  The district court issued an order giving Mr. Anderson approximately 
twenty more days to file a response before the district court dismissed the petition.  
(See R., pp.95-96.) 
 After that deadline passed, post-conviction counsel filed a Second Motion for 
More Time to Respond to Notice of Intent to Dismiss, based on counsel’s affidavit 
stating he needed more time to investigate potential witnesses, obtain a release of 
medical information from Mr. Anderson, and pursue additional leads.  (See R., pp.99-
101.)  The district court issued a second order, giving Mr. Anderson about thirty 
additional days to respond.  (See R., pp.102-03.) 
 Two days before the new deadline, Mr. Anderson filed, pro se, a “Motion to 
Proceed Pro Se Litigant,” a “Motion to Extend Time to Prepare Petition,” and a “Motion 
to Dismiss Court Appointed Counsel.”  (See R., pp.104-06.)  The first motion stated 
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Mr. Anderson brought “his motion to proceed as his own Pro Se Litigant in further 
litigation of his Post Conviction Relief.”  (R., p.104.)  The second motion stated he 
brought a “motion to extend time to prepare petition in support of his Post Conviction 
Relief with forthcoming [evidence] of additional witnesses, and documentation from both 
Canyon County Medical and Detention Centers.”  (R., pp.104-05.) 
 Mr. Anderson’s third motion, to dismiss court-appointed counsel, stated post-
conviction counsel “has provided me with Ineffective Assistance of [Counsel], in so far 
as I have, as of this date, not [acquired] repeatedly requested documents from Canyon 
County Medical and Detention Centers; key witnesses have either not been examined 
or examined ineffectually and all requests [were] met with unreasonable delay leading 
to repeated requests for extensions.”  (R., p.105.) 
 The district court conducted a status conference nine days after the deadline, 
where Mr. Anderson was not present but represented by post-conviction counsel.  (See 
R., p.107.)  The district court expressed its “intention to deny the motions and dismiss 
the petition.  We’ve extended it a couple times.”  (Tr., Oct. 19, 2015, p.3, Ls.11-13.)  
Mr. Anderson’s post-conviction counsel told the district court he had had some 
conversations with Mr. Anderson and had his investigator check on some potential 
witnesses.  (Tr., Oct. 19, 2015, p.3, Ls.15-17.)  Post-conviction counsel stated, “I have 
not discovered any good evidence upon which to base an Amended Petition.”  
(Tr., Oct. 19, 2015, p.3, Ls.17-18.)  Post-conviction counsel further stated he had 
advised Mr. Anderson “that this thing is probably—probably going to live or die based 
on his own affidavit and his previous petition; that I was not going to file an amended 
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one.  Subsequently, he gave me some witnesses.  I’ve checked on those.  They don’t 
change my position.”  (Tr., Oct. 19, 2015, p.3, Ls.19-25.) 
 The district court determined “on the motion to extend time, he hasn’t provided 
any facts to warrant an additional extension.  It’s been extended twice already.  So I’m 
going to deny the motion to extend time.”  (Tr., Oct. 19, 2015, p.4, Ls.1-4.)  The district 
court continued: “Deny—he doesn’t really have a right to counsel on the post-conviction.  
He can’t maintain a claim for ineffective assistance.  I’m going to deny the motions.”  
(Tr., Oct. 19, 2015, p.4, Ls.4-6.)   
 That same day, the district court issued an Order Denying Motions, denying 
Mr. Anderson’s three motions “[f]or the reasons set forth at the hearing.”  (R., pp.108-
19.)  The district court also entered an Order Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief, which noted “[n]o further information has been received by the Court.”  
(R., pp.110-19.)  Thus, the district court dismissed Mr. Anderson’s post-conviction 
petition.  (R., pp.118, 120-21.) 
 Mr. Anderson filed, pro se, a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s 
Order Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and Final Judgment.  (R., pp.122-
24.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Anderson’s motions to 
proceed as a pro se litigant, dismiss court-appointed counsel, and extend his time to 
prepare an amended petition? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Anderson’s Motions To 
Proceed As A Pro Se Litigant, Dismiss Court-Appointed Counsel, And Extend His Time 
To Prepare An Amended Petition 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Mr. Anderson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motions to proceed as a pro se litigant, dismiss court-appointed counsel, and extend his 
time to prepare an amended petition.  The district court did not recognize 
Mr. Anderson’s right to self-representation.  Mr. Anderson had a right to proceed pro se.  
As a corollary to his right to self-representation, Mr. Anderson had a right to dismiss 
court-appointed counsel.  The district court abused its discretion when it denied those 
motions because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards. 
 The district court also abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Anderson’s motion 
to extend his time to prepare an amended petition.  Because Mr. Anderson chose to 
proceed pro se but was not present at the status conference, he needed a continuance 
to exercise his right to self-representation, and being left unable to exercise that right 
meant Mr. Anderson’s substantial rights were prejudiced by the denial of the motion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 Decisions relating to whether to grant or deny a motion for continuance are within 
the discretion of the district court.  See State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 567 (2008); 
Hall v. State, 156 Idaho 125, 131 (Ct. App. 2014).  When an exercise of discretion is 
reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry into (1) whether 
the district court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the district 
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court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any 
legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the district court reached 
its decision by an exercise of reason.”  State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).  
“Additionally, the denial of a motion for continuance is an abuse of discretion only if the 
defendant can show his substantial rights have been prejudiced.”  Payne, 146 Idaho at 
567. 
 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Anderson’s 
 Motion To Proceed As A Pro Se Litigant 
 
 Mr. Anderson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion to proceed as a pro se litigant.  The district court did not recognize 
Mr. Anderson’s right to proceed pro se.  Thus, the district court did not act consistently 
with the applicable legal standards when it denied the motion.   
 Although it does not appear Idaho’s appellate courts have specifically addressed 
whether there is a right to proceed pro se in post-conviction proceedings, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has recognized a right to self-representation in other civil cases.  See 
Weston v. Gritman Mem’l Hosp., 99 Idaho 717, 720 (1978) (“We recognize the inherent 
right of a natural person to represent himself Pro se, but this right does not extend to 
representation of other persons or corporations.”); see also Idaho State Bar Ass’n v. 
Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 102 Idaho 672, 676 (1981) (same). 
 While the Idaho Supreme Court has not expressly named the source of the right 
to self-representation in civil cases, the right to proceed pro se seems to be drawn from 
the common law.  As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit put it, 
“[t]he origins of the right to appear for oneself in civil proceedings derive from a number 
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of sources, all deeply rooted in our history and culture.”  Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 
553, 557 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing the background of the statutory right to self-
representation in federal civil cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1654).2   
 The common law right to self-representation stems from 13th-century English law.  
Cf. VanWormer, 60 Vand. L. Rev. at 987 (“The right to represent oneself in the federal 
courts can be traced to medieval England.”).  The Magna Carta provides: “We will sell to 
no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right.”  Magna Carta 
(1297) § XXIX, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Edw1cc1929/25/9/section/ 
XXIX.  Further, the Iannaccone Court noted that, “[b]y the middle of the thirteenth 
century, lawyers so monopolized the courts in London that the King was forced to 
decree that, except in a few special causes, litigants were entitled to plead their own 
cases without lawyers.”  Iannaccone, 142 F.3d at 557.   
 The right to self-representation carried over to the American legal system.  
During the American colonial period, “mistrust of lawyers made appearance in court 
without benefit of counsel the preferred course,” and “the legal process still remained 
sufficiently simple to permit persons whether rich or poor to plead their own causes.”  Id.  
Further, “[c]olonial peoples’ notions of their own individual rights and their reliance on 
themselves were part of the movement away from religious authority and towards 
religious freedom,” and colonial Americans’ “broad literacy and . . . political involvement 
in their democratic institutions transformed the average American into a citizen-lawyer.”  
                                            
2 See generally Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out 
Of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 877, 932-35 (2012) (containing additional background on 
the right to self-representation); Nina Ingwer VanWormer, Comment, Help At Your 
Fingerprints: A Twenty-First Century Response To The Pro Se Phenomenon, 60 Vand. 
L. Rev. 983, 987-88 (2007) (same). 
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Id.  The Second Circuit wrote the notion was “perhaps best expressed by Thomas 
Paine, arguing in 1777 for a Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, who said that to plead 
one’s cause was ‘a natural right,’ pleading through counsel was merely an ‘appendage’ 
to the natural right of self-representation.”  Id.   
 While the right to proceed pro se in civil actions in federal courts is now 
guaranteed by federal statute, see id. at 556, there is apparently no corresponding 
Idaho statute expressly codifying the right to self-representation in civil cases.  
However, Idaho law provides “[t]he common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant 
to, or inconsistent with, the constitution or laws of the United States, in all cases not 
provided for in these complied laws, is the rule of decision in all courts of this state.”  
I.C. § 73-116; see Idaho Const. art. XXI, § 2 (“All laws now in force in the territory of 
Idaho which are not repugnant to this Constitution shall remain in force until they expire 
by their own limitation or be altered or repealed by the legislature.”).    
 English statutes in force on January 4, 1864, “when the provision contained in 
I.C. s 73-116 was first enacted . . . are included in the received ‘common law.’”  See Our 
Lady of Lourdes v. Vanator, 91 Idaho 407, 411 (1967) (McQuade, J., concurring in the 
result).  Because section XXIX of the Magna Carta was in force in 1864, the right to self-
representation derived from its provision that “we will sell to no man, we will not deny or 
defer to any man either Justice or Right” is part of the § 73-116 received common law. 
 Thus, Mr. Anderson had a common law right to self-representation in his post-
conviction proceeding, like any other litigant in a civil case in Idaho.  However, the 
district court denied Mr. Anderson’s motion to proceed as a pro se litigant without 
recognizing the denial would deprive him of his right to self-representation.  (See 
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R., p.108; Tr., Oct. 19, 2015, p.4, Ls.1-9.)  Because the district court did not act 
consistently with the applicable legal standards, the district court abused its discretion 
when it denied the motion to proceed as a pro se litigant.  See Hedger, 115 Idaho at 
600.  Thus, the district court’s order dismissing Mr. Anderson’s motion to proceed pro se 
should be reversed, and the matter should be remanded to allow Mr. Anderson to 
exercise his right to self-representation. 
 
D. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Anderson’s   
Motion To Dismiss Court-Appointed Counsel 
 
 Mr. Anderson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion to dismiss court-appointed counsel.  The corollary to the right to self-
representation in civil cases is the right to dismiss counsel.  Indeed, with respect to the 
statutory right to self-representation in federal court, the Second Circuit observed the 
party seeking to assert the right “must clearly and unequivocally discharge any lawyer 
previously retained.”  Iannaccone, 142 F.3d at 558.  The comments to Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.16 provide that “[a] client has a right to discharge a lawyer at 
any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer’s services.”  
I.R.P.C. 1.16 cmt. 4.   
 While the comments to Rule 1.16 also state “[w]hether a client can discharge 
appointed counsel may depend on applicable law,” I.R.P.C. 1.16 cmt. 5, Mr. Anderson 
submits the restrictions on discharging appointed counsel that apply to defendants in 
criminal cases do not apply to himself or other post-conviction petitioners.   
 The right to self-representation in criminal cases is guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 
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818 (1975).  The United States Supreme Court in Faretta acknowledged “the right of an 
accused to conduct his own defense seems to cut against the grain of this Court’s 
decisions holding that the Constitution requires that no accused can be convicted and 
imprisoned unless he has been accorded the right to the assistance of counsel.”  Id. at 
832.  Because an accused choosing to proceed pro se “relinquishes, as a purely factual 
matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel,” the Faretta 
Court held “in order to represent himself, the accused must knowingly and voluntarily 
forgo those relinquished benefits.”  Id. at 835 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
accused “should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his 
choice is made with eyes open.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 In light of Faretta, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that to be valid, a waiver of 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel by a defendant in a criminal case choosing to 
proceed pro se “must have been effected knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.”  
State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 64 (2003).  The Idaho Supreme Court has identified 
“contemporaneous Faretta warnings” as “perhaps the most prudent means to ensure 
the defendant’s grasp of the disadvantages of self-representation,” but also clarified it 
would “look to the record as a whole to determine if a [criminal defendant] knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional right.”  State v. Dalrymple, 144 
Idaho 628, 634 (2007).   
 Conversely, the Idaho Supreme Court has held there is no constitutional right to 
counsel in post-conviction proceedings, which are civil in nature.  See Murphy v. State, 
156 Idaho 389, 394-95 (2013).  Under Idaho Supreme Court precedent, there would be 
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no danger that a post-conviction petitioner choosing to go pro se would lose the benefits 
of a constitutional right to counsel.  Cf. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.  Thus, based on the 
decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court, the constitutionally-mandated restrictions on 
defendants in criminal cases do not apply to post-conviction petitioners seeking to 
discharge appointed counsel.  This approach is in accord with the Second Circuit’s 
approach to the federal statutory right to self-representation in civil cases: the 
Iannaccone Court did not mention Faretta-type warnings among the “qualifications” 
placed on the right.  See Iannaccone, 142 F.3d at 558. 
 Here, the district court denied the motion to dismiss court-appointed counsel on 
the basis Mr. Anderson “doesn’t really have a right to counsel on the post-conviction.  
He can’t maintain a claim for ineffective assistance.”  (See Tr., Oct. 19, 2015, p.4, Ls.4-
6.)   But even though Mr. Anderson could not raise a valid claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel against his post-conviction counsel under the Idaho Supreme 
Court’s decisions, see Murphy, 156 Idaho at 395, that does not negate his right to 
discharge counsel.  See I.R.P.C. 1.16 cmt. 4.  Because the district court did not act 
consistently with the applicable legal standards, the district court abused its discretion 
when it denied the motion to dismiss court-appointed counsel.  See Hedger, 115 Idaho 
at 600.  The district court’s order denying Mr. Anderson’s motion to dismiss court-
appointed counsel should be reversed, and the matter should be remanded to allow 
Mr. Anderson to discharge his post-conviction counsel. 
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E. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Anderson’s 
 Motion To Extend His Time To Prepare An Amended Petition 
 
 Mr. Anderson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied the 
motion to extend his time to prepare an amended petition.  Because Mr. Anderson 
chose to proceed pro se but was not present at the status conference, he needed a 
continuance to exercise his right to self-representation.  Because he was left unable to 
exercise his right to self-representation, Mr. Anderson’s substantial rights were 
prejudiced by the denial of his motion to extend time to prepare petition. 
 When reviewing the denial of a request for continuance, Idaho’s appellate courts 
have examined the circumstances surrounding the request.  See, e.g., Everhart v. 
Washington Cnty. Road & Bridge Dep’t, 130 Idaho 273, 275-76 (1997); Gubler v. Boe, 
120 Idaho 294, 296-97 (1991).  As noted above, “the denial of a motion for continuance 
is an abuse of discretion only if the defendant can show his substantial rights have been 
prejudiced.”  Payne, 146 Idaho at 567.   
 Here, the surrounding circumstances indicate the district court abused its 
discretion when it denied Mr. Anderson’s motion to extend time to prepare petition.  
Mr. Anderson submitted his motions for mailing before the deadline to respond to the 
district court’s notice of intent to dismiss.  (See R., p.106.)  In the motions, Mr. Anderson 
had unequivocally expressed his intention to proceed pro se.  (R., p.104.)  However, 
Mr. Anderson was not present at the status conference where the district court denied 
his motions.  (R., p.107.)  Thus, because Mr. Anderson chose to proceed pro se but 
was not present at the status conference, he needed a continuance to exercise his right 
to self-representation.   
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 Further, Mr. Anderson’s motion to extend time to prepare petition stated he 
wanted more time to “prepare petition in support of his post conviction relief with 
forthcoming evidence of additional witnesses, and documentation from both Canyon 
County Medical and Detention Centers.”  (R., p.105.)  While Mr. Anderson had been 
granted two prior continuances to respond to the notice of intent to dismiss (R., pp.95, 
102), those continuances had been requested by post-conviction counsel (R., pp.92, 
99), not by Mr. Anderson himself.  Post-conviction counsel ultimately did not respond to 
the notice of intent to dismiss.  (See R., p.117; Tr., Oct. 19, 2015, p.3, Ls.19-25.)   
Further, the district court dismissed Mr. Anderson’s post-conviction petition the same 
day it denied his motions.  (R., pp.108, 110-18.)  Thus, the denial of the motion to 
extend his time to prepare an amended petition meant Mr. Anderson was unable to 
exercise his right to self-representation and file an amended petition or other response 
to the notice of intent to dismiss.   
 The surrounding circumstances therefore indicate Mr. Anderson’s substantial 
rights were prejudiced by the denial of his motion to extend time to prepare petition.  Cf. 
Everhart, 130 Idaho at 275-76.  Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied the motion.  See Payne, 146 Idaho at 567.  The district court’s order denying 
Mr. Anderson’s motion to extend his time to prepare an amended petition should be 
reversed, and the matter should be remanded to allow Mr. Anderson an extension of 
time to prepare an amended petition or other response to the notice of intent to dismiss. 
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CONCLUSION 
 For the above reasons, Mr. Anderson respectfully requests this Court reverse the 
district court’s order and judgment dismissing his post-conviction petition, reverse the 
district court’s order denying his motions to proceed as a pro se litigant, dismiss court-
appointed counsel, and extend time to prepare an amended petition, and remand the 
matter to the district court for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 19th day of July, 2016. 
 
     _________/s/________________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
     Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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